Protracted problems following the 2010 elections

July 28th, 2010
Thousands of political prisoners, especially pro-democracy activists and ethnic-minority political activists, are still in prisons in Burma. The ethnic minority armed groups have consistently refused to accept the proposal of the military regime in Burma, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to transform their armed forces into government-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF) or local militia forces. There have been increasing military offensives by the Burmese Army in ethnic-minority regions in eastern Burma part. Hundreds of thousands of Burmese refugees living in Thailand cannot expect to go back home after elections.

These are Burma’s election dilemmas. The international community, including some ASEAN countries, demanded that the regime hold ‘free, fair and inclusive’ elections, but it has flatly rejected this idea. Restrictions of freedom in the 2008 Constitution and elections forced Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, National League for Democracy (NLD), to decide to not participate in the 2010 elections. No political prisoners are to be released before elections, and they have no rights to form political parties or to be members of a political party.

The 2010 Burmese elections are only free for the SPDC’s newly formed political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); the party has been formed of retired military commanders, led by Gen. Thein Sein, current Prime Minister of Burma. The USDP has freely raised funds for itself with the permission of the SPDC, and it has freely conducted a “political campaign” since 2009, while many ethnic-minority political are still waiting to be officially registered to run in the elections, and are struggling meet party budgets.

Is it “fair” to have a competition between the USDP and Burma’s other political parties, when the USDP is strong supported by the Burmese government? The original election laws are not fair, and totally restrict pro-democracy parties, ethnic-minority politicians, and political parties that won in Burma’s 1990 elections from running in the contest elections. The elections are not inclusive for all political forces, but the SPDC plans to retain it’s power through new name and a legitimate role.

The regime has to hold the elections, but only because of international pressure. On the other hand, Burma’s military leaders understand that they must retain their power through a new name in legitimated elections, as Burma has already been ruled by the military for over two decades. The regime certainly has no intentions to solve the country’s protracted problems.

Many people in Burma do not have much interest in elections, because they have already learned of the regime’s unfairness from the 2008 Constitutional Referendum. Because the voters already know about the doomed nature of the elections, and they have no ‘favorite political parties’ to vote for, they have no choice for their future.

Predictable results will come of Burma’s 2010 elections. The USDP will win the elections and will form a new government. Retired generals will hold cabinets posts. What will change? Burma’s generals will just be changing their clothes. Their political ideologies will remained the same. They will arrest anyone who is against the government. They will keep all political prisoners imprisoned, and could extend more prisons countrywide.

The new regime will allocate more of the nation’s budget to the Burmese Army, or tatmadaw. The fighting between ethnic-minority armed forces and the Burmese Army troops will be on-going. Human rights violations committed against members of ethnic minorities will continue, and thousands more people will be displaced from their homes. Some refugees in Thailand’s refugee camps will seek refuge in third countries. But many of them will be remained in refugee camps.

The upcoming elections, which have thus far not been “free, fair and inclusive” in nature in Burma, will not lead to democracy, national reconciliation, peace and prosperity. Many of Burma’s already protracted problems will remain the same.

Forced reconciliation is not healing Burma's ethnic minority strife

“Unity by force does not last long”. This is point that Burma's ethnic minority leaders often make to Burma's current military regime, pointing to past history for proof.

The Burmese military regime, the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, is pressuring many high-profile ethnic ceasefire groups from many different areas of Burma - Kachin, Mon, Wa and Shan - to transform their armed forces into “Border Guard Forces” or militia groups, without offering these groups any political settlement or solving any of the long-standing political problems between the SPDC and Burma's minority groups. The regime is using force to pressure ethnic minorities to remain under its control. Many ethnic armed groups have replied that without a political solution, which guarantees rights to their peoples, they will not surrender and will not transform their armed forces into Border Guard Forces or Militia forces. Hence, unity by force, just like in the past, will never work in the present day.

The current Burmese regime is very proud of their three kings, Anawrahta, Bayith Naung and Alung Paya, for establishing 1st, 2nd and 3rd Burman Empires in the 11st century, 15th century and 17th century respectively. Now, the SPDC has placed statures of these 3 kings in Naypyidaw, Burma's new capital, and the SPDC's military leaders salute them and pay tributes to them every year on their Armed Force Day, which falls on March 27th.

History shows that these 3 Burman kings established Burman empires using force and brutal atrocities against other non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the nation's frontier, connecting Mon and Arakan territory, and invading Thailand; in a similar manner, the current military government is trying to colonize all ethnic minorities in a “ 4th empire”. However, each of these 3 Burman empires collapsed in rebellions by ethnic minority groups.

Successive military governments and the Burmese army have invaded the ethnic minority territories since Burma's independence from Britain in 1948; these forces have exploited the ethnic minority regions’ rich natural resources - jade and mining in Kachin State, logs in Shan State and Karen State, natural gas from the Arakanese and the Mon people’s Andaman Sea - and hav weaged wars against these regions' people.

In 1947 and 1948, the ethnic minority groups dreamt about peace and unity with Burman leaders, led by Gen. Aung San (father of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), through the founding of a Federal Union of Burma by signing the Panglong Agreement in Shan State. This is the correct political solution for Burma's problems, but it has been rejected by successive military governments.

SPDC has moved along its 7 point “roadmap to democracy” without considering the different opinions of both pro-democracy opposition groups and ethnic minority nationalities. The SPDC only desires to preserve its political power legally, via the 2008 militarized constitution and its planned 2010 elections. Real national reconciliation will not happen with this constitution and the upcoming elections. Millions of ethnic minority people living in the country's border areas, conflict zones, and rural areas have no chance of participating in the upcoming elections.

A possible conflict could occur in the ethnic minority-controlled areas of Kachin State, Shan State, Mon State and Tenasserim Division, or in the nation's border areas with China and Thailand. Since the ethnic minority political armed groups have had experience with both politics and the military, it is not easy for the SPDC to manipulate these ethnic organizations into lying down and accepting forcible unity with the SPDC’s via its constitution.

The SPDC needs to realize that the country's current political situation is very different from what it was in past centuries, when the Burman kings ruled by force and pressure. In our modern world, where ‘unity through diversity’ is meaningful, the military commanders must alter their strategies in order to establish a union of Burma, where all ethnic groups can live in peace and harmony.

New War and Tantamount Danger in Monland

“We want to solve political problems by means of politics, therefore, we entered into a ceasefire and we will demand a political dialogue,” former New Mon State Party’s (NMSP) President Nai Shwe Kyin once said. Unfortunately, he passed away in 2003, and never saw a peaceful political dialogue within either Burma or Mon State; the situation has been worsening since the current military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) forcibly confirmed a military-dominated constitution in May 2008 through a people’s referendum, without international monitoring or thorough debates among Burma’s political parties or the nation’s people.

The Mon people lost the right to self-determination and self-rule after the fall of the Hongsawatoi kingdom in 1757, when it was annexed by the Burmese King Alungphaya. Since then, the Mon people have struggled to retain their rights through both armed struggle and legitimate political movements. The NMSP, which formed in 1958, waged war against the successions of Burmese military regimes based in Rangoon, until agreed to a ceasefire in 1995.

Just recently, after the SPDC declared that it was holding elections in 2010, and announced electoral laws, a political party formation law and a party registration law, the regime began pressuring ceasefire groups to abandon their arms and participate in the elections. Some non-politically motivated ceasefire groups agreed to participate in the elections, despite the fact that the Burmese military’s political representatives have special opportunities, in that they do not need to run in the elections, but will, under the 2008 constitution, automatically win 25% of the seats in both central level and local level parliaments.

Burma’s politically-motivated ceasefire groups do not want to enter into the elections without political warrantees for their people and their armed forces. But the regime has said that they must change their armed forces into “Border Guard Forces” (BGF) or “village militia forces”, and transform their political wings into political parties to run in the elections.

The NMSP has consistently stated that it refuses to participate in the 2010 elections prior to major changes to the 2008 constitution, as it favors the Burmese military’s possession of political power within the country. The NMSP has also argued that it did not want to transform its armed force, the New Mon Liberation Army (NMLA), into a Burmese government-controlled Border Guard Force (BFG) or paramilitary group, without a political dialogue that granted the right of self-determination to the Mon people.

The time of the ceasefire’s existence grows shorter and shorter, as the date of the elections comes closer and closer. The regime is not offering any alternative means of preserving the ceasefire. War could break out at any time during the regime-set 60 day period for political party registration. If registering groups are declared to be illegal political groups, a new war will begin.

Both the Burmese military and various ethnic minority armies have been involved in a decades-long civil war. No one group can win in this war, but the nation’s people continue to suffer. Mon refugees who returned to Burma from Thailand’s refugee camps in 1995, after the ceasefire, will have to flee into Thailand again. Thousands of Mon people will become internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many rural Mon people will lose their livelihoods and their lands after rebuilding their lives during the 15 year ceasefire period.

The UN Assembly, western governments, and ASEAN leaders have demanded that the regime solve political problems through a peaceful dialogue. But the regime has ignored these demands. It planted the seed for a new war with its 2008 constitution, and now the war will break out soon.

Now, Burma’s problem are becoming international problems, as the international community will have to take care of Burmese refugees, help Burmese people with socio-economic programs, etc. Therefore, the international community still has a role to play in stopping this new war within Burma.

US Engagements in Burma Should not Exclude Democracy and Reconciliation

Tue 20 Oct 2009,
It is good news to hear that US Sectary of State Hillary Clinton desires to “directly engage” with Burma’s decades-old military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to push for democratic transition and a review of sanctions.

The Burmese people honestly and urgently desire a better economy and basic freedoms, as they have demonstrated many times, from the time of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising to the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”. However, the SPDC’s inhumane attempts at silencing the Burmese people’s voices has sometimes incited the international community to attempt to intervene in Burma.

The UN has launched many “missions impossible” to pave the way for negotiations between the SPDC leaders and opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Unfortunately, the UN only offers the SPDC carrots – like aid for the Cyclone Nargis victims, and other development assistances – and when UN’s refused to provide these offering after the SPDC failed to comply with their aims, such “sticks” did not hurt the regime.

Now, the people of Burma just want to “wait and see” how tasteful the USA’s Obama administration’s carrots will be for the regime, and how much their sticks are able to hurt the regime. The people of Burma have always supported and admired USA’s effective policies against the regime in Burma, and they also believe the American people can help them. Some Burmese people even want to see a US invasion of their country, and harsh punishments for the Burmese government’s military regime.

Most of us want to see a peaceful democratic transition and national reconciliation in Burma without bloodshed, crackdowns, and war; we want to see this through free, fair, and participatory elections in 2010. Right now however, the people’s concern is that the 2008 constitution cannot guarantee a “democratic and unified” Burma.

Hence, in the USA’s engagements with Burma, the American government should demand for a review of the 2008 constitution, and the USA should encourage the regime to hold free, fair and participatory elections; America should also encourage the SPDC to initiate peaceful political talks with different ethnic nationalities, and to free all political prisoners. Then, the US can give a lot of carrots to the SPDC.

If the international community can makes sure that there will be a peaceful democratic transition, and some signs of much-promised national reconciliation within the country, the international sanctions on Burma should be lifted. If this situation ever occurs, US government and the international community can also consider offering reconstruction assistance to Burma.

The people in Burma expect the US administration to use their sticks and carrots effectively.